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I could feel the love he had for his
son – and his hurt. His boy was so
vulnerable.
Over the past two decades, I have
worked as an academic physician in
the field of neuroethics, focused on
advancing the care of patients with
severe brain injury and bringing the
fruits of neuroscience to a very marginalized population. I have chronicled my work,
and that of my colleagues, in Rights Come to Mind: Brain Injury, Ethics and the
Struggle for Consciousness, which was published by Cambridge University Press in
2015. To write that book, I interviewed more than 50 families who have been touched
by severe brain injury. Their stories of incredible highs and lows take them to the edge
of endurance. What they have told me would make you weep.
Yet now, with the last-minute passage of the 21st Century Cures Act in the prior
Congress, there is something more we can do for patients with severe brain injury
because it provides US$1.5 billion for brain research. Through the National Institutes
of Health’s Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies
(BRAIN) Initiative, the 21st Century Cures Act can bring to life additional science for
this underserved population.
The struggle for rehabilitation
Traumatic brain injuries [TBIs] account for 2.5 million emergency room visits
each year. Nearly 90 percent are evaluated and released (for example, many patients
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with concussion), but almost 300,000
with more serious injury need
hospitalization. For those who are
most gravely injured, their journey
can begin with brilliant, lifesaving
neurosurgical care that would have
been lost a few decades ago when I
was a medical student.
In New York state, for example,
death rates for severe TBI dropped
from 22 percent to 13 percent from
2001 to 2009. Over that time, doctors
began to respond to brain swelling
more effectively by shunting off spinal
fluid and even removing part of the
skull to let the injured brain expand
and then recover. These interventions
have been a game-changer and saved
countless lives.
But after gratitude for a life that
has been saved, the truly difficult part
begins. Patients and families face a
slow-paced and often fickle recovery.
Tragically, this phase is often made
more challenging by the burden of
poorly designed insurance coverage.
Families struggle to get their loved
ones needed rehabilitation. If they
do get rehabilitation, it is often too
short to make a difference. Indeed, if
patients are too slow to demonstrate
improvement, services can be cut
off because of stringent “medical
necessity” admission criteria, often
from third-party insurers.
This cutoff makes no sense. As I
argued with colleagues in the Journal
of Law Medicine and Ethics, if we
don’t know how long it takes the
injured brain to heal, how do we
know the pace is too slow? In the
end, the vast majority are placed in
a nursing home or institution, which
is euphemistically called “custodial
care.” Fewer than 15 percent of people
with moderate to severe TBI get inpatient rehabilitation.
Can rights come to mind?
For years, we thought this was the
end of the story. These patients were
deprived of skilled and sustained
rehabilitation because we thought

there was no hope. But in the last
decade, neuroscience has made great
breakthroughs in our understanding
of the brain and its resilience.
With proper and state-of-the-art
rehabilitation, 21 percent of the most
grievously injured can achieve
functional independence. That might
not seem like a big number, but no
one would have predicted this when
these people rolled into the emergency
room. But with devoted care and
sustained rehabilitation, this level of
recovery was achieved.
One of the most distressing
realizations has been that many
patients who are thought to be
permanently unconscious or vegetative
– and thus ignored and neglected – are
in fact conscious and aware. In fact,
one study found that two out of every
five patients in nursing homes who
have a traumatic brain injury and are
thought to be vegetative were actually
conscious when carefully assessed. It
is a staggering error rate, which would
be unthinkable if we were talking
about making a credible diagnosis of
heart disease or cancer.
Recent studies using neuroimaging
of the brain have revealed this
powerfully in patients who appear
vegetative but are in fact minimally
conscious. For these patients there
is a disconnect between thought and
action. Patients demonstrate conscious
responses on their scans but don’t
show external or behavioral evidence
of awareness on clinical examination.
It is understandable that the
diagnosis can be missed. That’s the
more innocent explanation. And it
can be mitigated with more thorough,
and repeated, assessments. More
nefariously, many clinicians look
at these patients and assume that
they aren’t there, acculturated by
preconceptions and their biases.
Either way, this is consequential
and more than just a misdiagnosis.
Labeling someone as permanently
unconscious becomes a label and a
prison. These people are locked away

from the rest of us because they are
mistakenly thought to be unconscious
when they are not.
What does it mean to write these
people off? What does it mean
to mark a patient as permanently
unconscious when he is in fact aware
and in the room? Imagine what it
must be like to lie in a nursing home
bed and be ignored as if you weren’t
there, estranged from your family and
the broader human community. Could
anything be more isolating?
New treatments bring new hope
To be sure, we don’t want to be
overly optimistic about anyone’s
prospects. For many, pessimism
may be justified, but increasingly,
progress in neuroscience is making
it possible for us to identify patients
who are able to make recoveries once
thought impossible and to help their
brains recover. This is more than a
pipe dream as new drugs, devices and
neuroimaging are starting to bring
some patients back from the abyss.
For example, a flu drug has been
shown to accelerate the recovery of
consciousness; deep brain stimulation
has demonstrated the ability to restore

functional communication in a proof
of principle clinical trial in which I
was involved as a coinvestigator to
a patient in the minimally conscious
state; and neuroimaging is peering
into the disconnect between thought
and behavior and helping patients
communicate who otherwise couldn’t.
This is still early research, but the
science is incredibly promising. And
this makes the challenges posed
by insurance barriers all the more
troubling.
It suggests we cannot think of this
as simply a health care financing
question, but something deeper and
more fundamental. To me, it’s a
civil rights issue and one that gets
to the core of whom we value and
who counts. When these people are
misdiagnosed and ignored, they
become invisible. I fear they simply
don’t count.
Just as we have worked to
mainstream kids with Down
syndrome or autism and worked to
better integrate them into society
instead of institutionalizing them,
we must do the same for those with
traumatic brain injuries. We need
to reintegrate them back into their

communities and develop the tools
that will help them recover.
Many people see the 21st
Century Cures Act as a boon for
medical research, but I also see it as
legislation that will help realize the
civil rights of people with severe
brain injury. With new understanding
and better neurotechnologies, we
can help patients communicate and
reengage with their world.
The long arc of justice demands
nothing less for citizens with
severe brain injury. At a time of
deep national division, the care of
people with severe brain injury is
something we can all rally around.
This collective responsibility speaks
to fundamental American values.
Joe Fins, MD, MACP
The E. William Davis, Jr., M.D.
Professor of Medical Ethics and
Professor of Medicine
Chief Division of Medical Ethics
Weill Cornell Medicine
Solomon Center Distinguished
Scholar in Medicine, Bioethics and
the Law, Yale Law School, Cornell
University
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MORAL CASE DELIBERATION: FACILITATING A STRUCTURED
DIALOGUE WITH INVOLVED STAKEHOLDERS
Facilitation of moral case
deliberation (MCD) is a relatively new
form of clinical ethics support (CES)
that is rather unknown in the U.S. but
is getting increasing attention within
Europe (especially the Netherlands,
Norway, and Sweden) (Stolper et
al., 2015; Molewijk, Slowther &
Aulisio, 2016). In MCD, health care
professionals (physicians, nurses,
social workers, etc.), managers,
family, and/or patients discuss a moral
question derived from a concrete
clinical case with a trained and
certified MCD facilitator (Molewijk
taskforce on the Core Competencies
et al., 2008). Abma and colleagues
for Health Care Ethics Consultation
(2009) identified four main goals of
describes a more procedural and
MCD:
expert approach of the ethics
1. to reflect upon a case and to
consultant when discussing ‘the ethics
define and improve the quality
facilitation approach.’” One of the
of care within that case;
central goals of the ethics consultant
2. to reflect on what it means to
is to answer the question, ‘‘Who is the
be a good professional and to
appropriate decision maker within this
enhance a professional’s moral
concrete situation?’’ in a morally and
competencies;
legally right way. When responding
to ethics case consultation within
3. to improve multidisciplinary
this approach, the ethics consultant
team cooperation and to let
teams deal with disagreement in “focuses more on the answer of the
a (more) constructive way; and question ‘What is [emphasis added]
morally right?’ In contrast, the
4. to use insights from MCDs in
MCD facilitator focuses more on the
order to develop, adjust and
systematic reflection upon the way
implement institutional policies
MCD participants reason about what
and/or guidelines.
they think is morally right. The MCD
MCD can be organized ad hoc (upon facilitator can also ask about or refer
request), on a structural basis (e.g.
to existing policies, regulations and
every month one MCD at the ward)
laws (but specific knowledge about
or planned within a specific project.
these existing policies, regulations and
For example, say CES staff are asked laws is not a formal requirement for
to help staff at a mental health care
the MCD facilitator). As Stolper and
institution to reflect upon the use of
colleagues (2016, p. 3) summarize:
coercion (e.g., chemical and physical “Some key principles of MCD are:
restraints). They may use MCD within
1. [using] experience as a starting
this project to help staff reflect upon
point for moral reflection;
moral reasons for the use of coercion.
2. tak[ing] into account variations
How does MCD differ from ethics
related to interpretations and
consultation? Abma and colleagues
appreciations of facts by the
(2009, p. 219) write: “… the ASBH
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participants of MCD plus the
conclusions drawn by them;
3. linking the values and norms of
the participants to concrete facts
in the case; and
4. [using] dialogue as a process
and product in which knowledge
and practical wisdom [emerge
and are] fleshed out by learning
by doing.”
All MCD sessions are structured
by a specific conversation method.
One example is the Socratic Dialogue
method (Steinkamp & Gordijn, 2003).
Another is the Dilemma method
(Stolper et al., 2016). Procedural
components of the latter are listed
in Table 1. Within MCD, ethical
issues are not defined beforehand; the
definition of ‘the’ ethical issue or ‘the’
key moral question is a result of a
structured reflective process focusing
on the experiences and viewpoints of
the MCD participants. This is because
the MCD facilitator is aware of the
fact that defining the moral issue is
itself a normative process that requires
critical inquiry. In MCD, the moral
problem under consideration is always
a concrete moral issue, experienced
by one of the participants. This issue
is presented as a case (for example,
concerning a treatment decision for

an individual patient). The case
is analyzed, not by deductively
applying general moral concepts or
principles, but by investigating values
and norms of the stakeholders in the
case. The facilitator, who could be
described as a Socratic guide deconstructing conclusions and related
presuppositions of MCD participants,
aims to stimulate reflection on both
personal moral experiences and
considerations, and similarities and
discrepancies among the views and
experiences of other participants in
the MCD (Stolper et al, 2016).
MCD emphasizes the variation
in thoughts and experiences of
health care professionals. In MCD,
different viewpoints are examined
and scrutinized. The initial aim is
not to decide which perspective or
answer is morally right, but to ask
open and critical questions in order
to elaborate assumptions behind
the perspective, and find out how
it is applicable to the case at hand.
When one of the participants brings
in an ethical notion, for instance the
concept of autonomy, the focus will
be on examining what autonomy
means for this person in this case,
and why it is regarded as important
for this person. This may result in a
deliberation on various interpretations
of autonomy, and their relevance
for the argumentation with respect
to the dilemma in the case (Stolper
et al, 2016). In the end, if the MCD
participants aim for a final decision
or answer, then the MCD facilitates
the MCD participants in the process
of weighing pros and cons of various
actions in order to let the group make
their final decision (or compromise).
Finally, the MCD facilitator usually
does not give substantial advice and
does not function as an expert of a
specific ethics subject. This does
not mean that the MCD facilitator
does not need any ethics expertise
and that he\she is merely focusing
on communication or mediation
(Metselaar et al., 2015). The

expertise of the facilitator consists
of, among other things, fostering a
sincere and constructive dialogue
among the participants (aiming at a
moral inquiry instead of leading a
discussion about the question ‘Who is
right?’), keeping an eye on the moral
dimensions of the case, supporting
the quality of a joint moral reasoning
process, and helping the group in
planning actions in order to improve
the quality of patient care. In the
end, MCD is not a substitute for
clinical ethics consultation or ethics
committee deliberations: all three
CES mechanisms can be used for
different purposes.
For those interested in learning
more about MCD, an international
intensive training for becoming an
MCD facilitator is being offered in
Amsterdam January 7-10, 2018. For
more information, contact the author
at b.molewijk@vumc.nl.
Bert Molewijk, RN, PhD
Associate professor clinical ethics
support & coordinator European
Clinical Ethics Support (ECEN)
Department of Medical Humanities,
VU University medical centre
(VUmc), APH (Quality of Care),
Amsterdam, the Netherlands &
Centre for Medical Ethics, Institute
of Health and Society, Faculty of
Medicine, University of Oslo,
P.O. Box 1130, Blindern NO-0318,
Oslo, Norway

learning in dialogue. Am J Bioeth,
15(1), 50-1.
Molewijk A.C., Abma, T., Stolper,
M, Widdershoven, G. (2008).
Teaching ethics in the clinic: The
theory and practice of moral case
deliberation. J Med Ethics, 34,
120 -124.
Molewijk, B., Slowther, A.,
Aulisio, M. (2016). Clinical
ethics: support. In: Encyclopedia
of Global Bioethics (ed. Henk
ten Have). Springer Science
and Business Media, Dordrecht.
Living Reference Work Entry,
Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics,
1-8.
Steinkamp, N., Gordijn B. (2003).
Ethical case deliberation on
the ward. A comparison of four
methods. Med Health Care Philos,
6(3), 235-46.
Stolper, M., Molewijk, B.,
Widdershoven, G. (2015). Learning
by doing. Training health care
professionals to become facilitators
of moral case deliberation. HEC
Forum, 27(1), 47-59.
Stolper, M., Widdershoven, G.,
Molewijk, B. (2016). The dilemma
method. A conversation method
for moral case deliberation. BMC
Medical Ethics, 17, 45.

REFERENCES
Abma, T., Molewijk, B.,
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Improving the quality of care
through moral deliberation and
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Moral case deliberation as moral
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TABLE 1. THE DILEMMA METHOD FOR
MORAL CASE DELIBERATION (MCD)
Procedural components of the Dilemma Method for moral case deliberation (MCD) (Stolper et al., 2016)
include:
1. MCD facilitator introduces self and participants and explains the goals, expectations, and process of
MCD, including note-taking and confidentiality of notes;
2. Case presenter presents his/her case briefly, using concrete facts;
3. Case presenter formulates her/his core dilemma according
to the following format: Should I do A or B?
4. Participants ask questions for clarification in order to
imagine what it means to be in that situation so that later
on in the MCD they can answer the dilemma question for
themselves.
5. Facilitator constructs table identifying ‘present
perspectives/persons,’ ‘values,’ and ‘norms/rules/actions.’
Asks each participant to describe his/her core values and
norms with respect to the dilemma question. Connects
values/norms to original dilemma (A or B).
6. Facilitator lists possible alternatives (without discussing feasibility).
7. Participants write down on paper the following answers for themselves:
(a) I think the right thing to do is . . .
(b) Because . . .
(c) Therefore I’m not able to do . . .
(d) How can I cope with or decrease the moral loss related to the other side of the dilemma?
(e) Which virtues and actions are necessary to do the right thing?
8. Participants reflect upon possible group consensus or decision:
(a) What are remarkable points of consensus and disagreement? What kind of underlying questions
does that raise?
(b) Given the points mentioned, which answer to the dilemma is possible for the moment?
(c) If there is any substantial disagreement: how should we deal with that?
9. Facilitator schedules follow-up appointments and plans date and place to evaluate those appointments
and to identify closure of MCD. Summary of notes provided to participants.
10. Participants evaluate (through discussion and by questionnaire) the MCD. What about the process? Have
we met our goals? What could be improved the next time?
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POLICY STATEMENTS PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR
MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING
The Society of Critical Care
Medicine’s ethics committee
recently issued a policy statement
on defining futile and potentially
inappropriate interventions (Kon,
et al., 2016a). This policy statement
clarifies a prior multi-society policy
statement (Bosslet, et al., 2015)
that recommended only using the
term medically futile to refer to
interventions that have no physiologic
chance of achieving a desired goal,
such as antibiotics to treat viral
infections.
The more recent policy statement
goes into more detail regarding the
appropriate goals of intensive care
unit (ICU) care (i.e., “treatment that
provides a reasonable expectation for
survival outside the acute care setting
with sufficient cognitive ability to
perceive the benefits of treatment”
and goals of “palliative care that
provides comfort to patients through
the dying process”). Further guidance
is provided on how case-by-case
decisions should be made using a
process-based approach.
A companion policy statement
drafted by the American College
of Critical Care Medicine and
the American Thoracic Society
provides additional guidance to
ICU clinicians regarding shared
decision-making (SDM) in ICUs
(Kon, et al., 2016b). SDM is defined
as “a collaborative process that
allows patients, or their surrogates,
and clinicians to make healthcare
decisions together, taking into
account the best scientific evidence
available, as well as the patient’s
values, goals, and preferences.”
Clinicians are encouraged to use
SDM to define a patient’s overall
goals of care and “when making
major treatment decisions that may
be affected by personal values,

goals, and preferences.” Clinicians’
“default” approach to SDM
should include: (1) exchanging
information, (2) deliberating, and
(3) making a treatment decision.
The recommendations acknowledge
a range of ethically supportable
decision-making approaches (e.g.,
patient-directed, surrogate-directed,
or clinician-directed models) that
clinicians should select from based
on the preferences of the patient or
surrogate and contextual details of
each situation. The policy statement
includes examples of preferencesensitive decisions in the ICU and
key communication skills clinicians
should master in SDM. For example,
a patient/surrogate has the right to
defer certain decisions to a clinician;
this is distinct from strict paternalism
in that in this approach to SDM, the
clinician understands the patient’s
values and uses them to determine the
plan of care, and the patient/surrogate
is offered as much information as
desired (in understandable language)
and recognizes that (s)he can change
his/her mind and be supported.
The American Thoracic Society
also recently published policy and
clinical recommendations for medical
decision-making for “unbefriended”
older adults, updating their 1996
position statement. They call for
policy changes to achieve more
consistent and fair approaches
for this population across states
and health care delivery settings.
Clinical recommendations include
avoiding ad hoc approaches by
developing standardized methods to
make decisions for these individuals
(particularly in urgent situations),
considering non-traditional surrogate
decision-makers for these individuals,
assessing medical decision-making
capacity systematically, ensuring

that “patients with long-term
incapacity have longitudinal access
to a decision-making surrogate
who is familiar with the patient’s
medical condition and specific
circumstances,” and when applying
the best interest standard to these
individuals, that ethics committees
should “synthesize all available
evidence, including cultural and
ethnic factors” when they deliberate
about treatment decisions (Ferrell et
al., 2016).
Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
MHECN Program Coordinator
Ethics & Research Consultant
Baltimore, MD
REFERENCES
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potentially inappropriate
treatments in intensive care units.
Am J Respir Crit Care Med,
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Ferrell, T.S., et al. (2016). AGS
position statement: Making
medical treatment decisions
for unbefriended older adults. J
Am Geriatr Soc, epublication
November 22.
Kon, A., et al. (2016a).
Defining futile and potentially
inappropriate interventions:
A policy statement from the
Society of Critical Care Medicine
ethics committee. Critical Care
Medicine, 44(9), 1769-1774.
Kon, A, et al. (2016b). Shared
decision making in ICUs: An
American College of Critical
Care Medicine and American
Thoracic Society policy
statement.
Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter 7

CASE PRESENTATION
The following case study and Dr. Levenson’s response are reprinted with permission from the Handbook for Nursing Home
Ethics Committees, edited by Diane Hoffmann, Philip Boyle, and Steve Levenson, and published by the American Association
of Homes and Service for the Aging in 1995. Anita Tarzian reflects on how Dr. Levenson's analysis holds up over 20 years
later.
CASE STUDY FROM A NURSING HOME
An eighty-six-year-old woman, Mrs. Green, was admitted to a nursing home because of progressive dementia due
to Alzheimer's disease. She had never made any advance directives and was incapable of doing so. She had significant
tardive dyskinesia—uncontrollable movements of the face and mouth—resulting from previous administration of
psychotropic medications. She was bedbound, totally dependent in her activities of daily living, and fed via a gastrostomy
tube. She was on Dilantin for a seizure disorder. She was alert, but only made some incoherent noises in response to
questions. Her family stated that while she had never made an advance directive, she had previously expressed her
wish that her life not be prolonged indefinitely by extraordinary measures. After several years in the facility with little
change, they felt that her persistent bedbound state and limited cognitive function were not consistent with a desirable
quality of life. They requested that her physician treat her as a terminal resident, and discontinue any aggressive medical
interventions. Her physician agreed not to implement antibiotics, but did not think that her condition was terminal. A
consultant physician agreed that her condition was not terminal but that not using any antibiotics would be appropriate
About six months later, she developed an abscess in her left inner thigh. Her attending physician insisted that antibiotics
should be used to treat this, since she was not dying. At the same time, the family found out that the physician had been
maintaining her on a long-term prophylactic dose of a urinary anti-infective. The family requested a change in physician.
The new physician agreed not to use antibiotics and was prepared to treat her as terminally ill, but the medical director
and other physicians in the nursing home met and decided that it was not appropriate to manage her case in this way. The
resident's family requests an ethics committee consult.
COMMENTS FROM A
GERIATRICIAN
Mrs. Green was in the
advanced stages of a progressive,
irreversible condition. While
she was alert, she was totally
dependent and bedbound. There
was no way of ascertaining if she
was aware of her surroundings.
This case illustrates the
difficulties of deciding on the
appropriateness of treatment
when a person is not terminal
but has potentially treatable
conditions that could hasten death
if not treated. It also illustrates
the difficulties of absolute
prohibitions of a particular form
of treatment contrasted with
treatment in a given situation.
The family claimed that she
had certain wishes regarding the
use of extraordinary measures.
Because these had never been
documented, they could at best
apply a substituted judgment
8 Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter

standard in making decisions for her.
If this did not seem to apply, then a
"best interests" standard would apply.

to improve her condition or restore
some quality of life in the face of an
inevitably progressive condition.

This case is also complicated by the
difficulties in defining terminal, and
the problem of laws limiting treatment
decisions to the "terminal" situation.
[See next commentary for a discussion
of the “end-stage” condition.] In
Mrs. Green's case, her degenerative
condition was advanced, but her
death was not necessarily imminent.
Many individuals are not necessarily
terminal, but nevertheless have little
hope for recovery or improvement.
Various state laws have been, and
should continue to be, revised to allow
for more flexible decision making in
cases other than terminal conditions.
If such a law had been in effect at the
time this case was being managed,
it would not have been necessary to
argue over whether the condition was
terminal. Instead, efforts could have
been focused on prospects for further
general decline or improvement and
the likelihood of any intervention

The physician may have been
deceptive in his use of prophylactic
anti-infectives to prevent urinary
tract infections. There had been an
agreement not to use antibiotics, in
anticipation of an infection that could
eventually lead to a terminal state.
While an anti-infective is technically
not an antibiotic, the basic spirit of
the agreement was not being honored.
This decision should have been
discussed openly with the family.
The occurrence of the abscess
raises the issue of the absolute
prohibition of various treatments.
The typical prohibition against
antibiotics is intended to prevent their
use to aggressively treat a significant
systemic infection (pneumonia,
septic shock) that would otherwise
probably progress to death. However,
a localized abscess is not exactly the
same as a major pneumonia or septic
shock. In some cases, managing

the abscess could be considered a
comfort measure. In any event, a
week's course of antibiotics probably
would have helped resolve the
abscess, but it was not likely to
significantly prolong this resident's
life.
A facility ethics committee should
review the case and consider the
evidence. If the attending physician
does not agree with the wishes
of a surrogate decision maker,
there should be a mechanism for
changing physicians. The ethics
committee is an appropriate forum
for all sides—facility administration,
medical director, other physicians,
family, resident—to present their
perspectives and reasons. Other
physicians should not simply have the
prerogative to block an appropriately
agreed upon course of action.
In this case, an ethics committee
could help all parties review the case
and better understand each other's
positions. Often, disagreements
occur because of different starting
premises. The various parties argue
over conclusions but may not ever
discuss the underlying premises
that led them to those conclusions.
The ethics committee can play
an important role in getting those
parties to focus first on these starting
premises. If the parties cannot agree
on the underlying premises, then the
ethics committee should strongly
encourage flexible decision making
rather than a decision simply imposed
by those with the authority to do so.
The primary emphasis should be
resident-centered, i.e., the potential
benefits or drawbacks of the proposed
interventions for the resident. Often,
the parties can agree on the best
clinical course, but some of them may
fear the consequences of making a
particular decision, based on legal or
other considerations. Thus, the parties
should be encouraged to think first
about the clinical and ethical aspects
of the case, deferring considerations
that are self-serving (such as
questions of legal liability). If they
can agree on what is the best ethical

and clinical course of action, they
may then be able to address the legal
concerns constructively.
If the facility does not agree
with limitations on care, the family
should have the option to remove the
resident to another facility. Although
not all circumstances can be
anticipated, a facility's policies about
limiting or withdrawing treatments
should be clarified upon admission,
rather than created on an ad hoc basis
as cases arise. The ethics committee
should play a major role in such
policy clarification.
Steven A. Levenson, MD
Geriatrician
Towson, MD
COMMENTS FROM AN ETHICS
CONSULTANT
In the above commentary, Dr.
Levenson mentioned the value
of state laws that don’t restrict
decisions to withhold or withdraw
life-prolonging interventions to
patients in a terminal condition.
Maryland’s Health Care Decisions
Act (HCDA) is one such law. In
addition to a terminal condition, it
recognizes the “end-stage condition”
and persistent vegetative state
as conditions allowing a legally
authorized decision-maker to
withhold or withdraw life-prolonging
interventions if consistent with
a patient’s known wishes or best
interests. The HCDA defines “endstage” condition as “an advanced,
progressive, irreversible condition
caused by injury, disease, or
illness that has caused severe and
permanent deterioration indicated
by incompetency and complete
physical dependency and for which,
to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, treatment of the irreversible
condition would be medically
ineffective” [HCDA, §5–601(j)].
While some disability rights
advocates have expressed concern
that individuals who are dependent
on others for daily care because

of a long-standing disability may
erroneously be designated as “endstage” (Carlson, Smith & Wilker,
2012), an “end-stage” condition
must be advanced and progressive
and have caused severe and
permanent deterioration, not physical
dependency alone. In fact, the HCDA
specifies that a surrogate’s decision to
withhold or withdraw life–sustaining
procedures should not be based on
a patient’s preexisting, long–term
mental or physical disability [HCDA
§5–606(c)(3)].
Mrs. Green appears to meet the
end-stage definition based on the
description of how her Alzheimer’s
disease has progressed. The first
step in an ethics consultation would
be to find out whether Mrs. Green’s
physician agrees that Mrs. Green
meets this definition, and if so,
whether two-physicians have certified
that Mrs. Green is in an end-stage
condition. (It would also help to visit
Mrs. Green to confirm that how she
presents is consistent with others’
descriptions.) The HCDA provides
direction for who is considered the
legally authorized decision-maker.
The hierarchy order among family
members (assuming there is no
appointed guardian; we know there is
no health care agent) is:
1. Spouse or domestic partner
2. Adult child
3. Parent
4. Adult sibling
5. Friend or other relative who
knows the patient well.
For a friend or “other relative” to
make decisions for Mrs. Green, an
affidavit would need to be presented
to the attending physician stating that
the person is a relative or close friend
of the patient who has maintained
regular contact with the patient
and is “familiar with the patient’s
activities, health, and personal
beliefs” [HCDA §5–606(a)(3)(ii)
(2)]. For the purposes of this analysis,
let’s assume there is consensus
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among Mrs. Green’s family members
(including whomever is designated
as the authorized decision-maker
according to the above hierarchy)
that her life should not be prolonged
by any means. It may be helpful to
review the HCDA’s guidance for
surrogates – specifically, that “[a]ny
person authorized to make health care
decisions for another … shall base
those decisions on the wishes of the
patient” (i.e., “substituted judgment”),
which requires consideration of the
patient’s:
•

current diagnosis and prognosis
with and without the treatment
at issue;

•

expressed preferences
regarding the provision of, or
the withholding or withdrawal
of, the specific treatment at
issue or of similar treatments;

•

relevant religious and moral
beliefs and personal values;

•

behavior, attitudes, and past
conduct with respect to the
treatment at issue and medical
treatment generally;

•

reactions to the provision of, or
the withholding or withdrawal
of, a similar treatment for
another individual; and

•

expressed concerns about
the effect on the family or
intimate friends of the patient
if a treatment were provided,
withheld, or withdrawn [HCDA
§5–606(c)(2)(i-vi)].

The case study lacks detail
regarding whether Mrs. Green’s
family thought through these
considerations. They seem to be
basing their request to withhold
antibiotics on their appraisal of
her poor quality of life, perhaps
concluding that she would be
better off dead than in her present
diminished condition. This is a kind
of “best interest” consideration,
which the HCDA instructs surrogates
to employ “if the wishes of the patient
are unknown or unclear.” Thus, the
10 Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter

ethics consultant(s) should remind
the family (and authorized decisionmaker in particular) of the important
task of using substituted judgment to
inform medical decision-making for
Mrs. Green.
The next question that arises is
whether, absent an advance directive,
it would be likely that Mrs. Green’s
family would know what her wishes
were regarding use of antibiotics in
her current situation. A decision to
withhold CPR attempts or dialysis
carries a different risk-benefit analysis
than use of antibiotics. Antibiotics
may, for example, improve comfort
if they prevent or treat an infection
that increases suffering. While
health care professionals often share
stories of patients who were kept
alive by medical technology only to
face a prolonged and painful dying
process, does use of antibiotics fall in
this category? It is worth exploring
whether the family’s concern is truly
her comfort and quality of life or in
finding an opportunity for her to “die
sooner rather than later.” This doesn’t
mean it’s wrong to conclude that Mrs.
Green would prefer to die sooner
rather than later, or even that dying
sooner would be in her best interest.
Rather, it’s important to consider the
burdens and benefits of antibiotic
use and ensure that decision-making
is consistent with best available
evidence and facts, Mrs. Green’s
wishes (if known), and the goals of
care for her.
Absent an advance directive and
clear indication of Mrs. Green’s
wishes, it would be difficult to
support goals of care that prioritized
hastening her death over maintaining
her comfort. For example, if Mrs.
Green was moaning and wincing
when the leg with the abscess was
moved and physicians felt that
treating the abscess would improve
her comfort but the family insisted
on withholding the antibiotic with the
goal of hastening her death, it would
be appropriate for the physicians to
challenge this. Providing palliative

care at the end of life is a medical
standard and it’s right for physicians
to advocate for this. However, if that
was not the case (e.g., Mrs. Green did
not seem to be uncomfortable and/
or the antibiotics seemed to cause
other uncomfortable side effects),
the ethics consultant(s) should elicit
more information about the basis of
the physicians’ concerns. Do they feel
they would be complicit in hastening
her death? Do they fear that state
surveyors may sanction them for not
treating an infection? Do they fear
litigation from the family? According
to Maryland’s HCDA, a physician
“who acts in accordance with the
recommendation of the [patient care
advisory] committee is not subject to
liability for any claim based on lack
of consent or authorization for the
action” [HCDA §5–606(b)]. What’s
“legal” and “ethical” is grounded in
what is considered “good medicine.”
In this case, applying the legal and
ethical standards should reveal the
path forward. A decision to withhold
antibiotics for Mrs. Green (as well
as other potentially life-prolonging
interventions) should be based on a
thoughtful consideration of what she
would want and what would provide
the most benefit and least burden to
her.
Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
MHECN Program Coordinator
Ethics & Research Consultant
Baltimore, MD
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CALENDAR OF EVENTS
AUGUST
10-12- Conflict Resolution and Clinical-Setting Mediation for
Healthcare, sponsored by the Center for Conflict Resolution in
Healthcare LLC, Memphis, TN. Visit: http://www.healthcaremediation.net/trainings.html.
17-20- Intensive Workshop in Conflict Resolution, sponsored by
The Penn Program in Clinical Conflict Management, Perelman
School of Medicine, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia,
PA. For more information, contact: fiester@upenn.edu.
SEPTEMBER
7- Florida Ethics: Debates, Decisions, Solutions: 25th Annual
Conference, sponsored by The University of Miami Institute
for Bioethics and Health Policy, Miami, FL. Visit: http://www.
bioethics.net/events/florida-ethics-debates-decisions-solutions25th-annual-conference/.
11-13- Ethical Leadership for Tomorrow's Health Care
Organizations, sponsored by The Aspen Program for Ethical
Healthcare Leadership, Miami, FL. Visit: http://fbn.med.miami.
edu/.
14-15- 7th Annual Western Michigan University Medical
Humanities Conference, sponsored by the Fetzer Center,
Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI. Visit: http://
www.wmich.edu/medicalhumanities/events/conference2017.
15- Building an “Inclusive Climate”: Addressing “ism” Issues
in the Workplace in Trying Times, 2017 Judy Levy Ethics
Workshop sponsored by The Kennedy Krieger Institute Social
Work Department, The Shepard Pratt Conference Center,
Towson, MD. Contact: SwannA@KennedyKrieger.org.
OCTOBER
9-11- A Virtual Conference on Refugee & Migrant Health,
Mobility, Human Rights & Responsibilities. Visit: https://
resistingborders.com/.
27-29- Crossing Disciplines: Strategies for Humanizing One
Another, the 2017 Humanities in Medicine Symposium,
Sponsored by the Dolores Jean Lavins Center for Humanities
in Medicine at the Mayo Clinic, Rochester, MN. Visit: http://
mayoclinic.org.
19-22- Journey to the Center of Bioethics and the Humanities,
195y Annual Meeting of the American Society for Bioethics &
Humanities, Kansas City, KS. Visit: http://www.asbh.org.
NOVEMBER
2-3- The Medicalization of Poverty, Co-sponsored through the
University of Illinois (Medicine, Law), University of Virginia
(Medicine, Public Health, Biomedical Ethics) and the Carle
Illinois College of Medicine, University of Illinois, UrbanaChampaign. Visit: https://law.illinois.edu/faculty-research/
specialty-programs/epstein-health-law-and-policy/.

7- Transforming Substance Use Disorders - Fourth
Annual Interprofessional Forum on Ethics and
Religion in Health Care, sponsored by the Institute
for Jewish Continuity; the University of Maryland
Schools of Medicine, Nursing, Pharmacy, and
Social Work; the UMB Graduate School, and the
Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network at
Maryland Carey Law. UMB’s Southern Management
Corporation Campus Center, 621 W. Lombard St.,
Baltimore, MD. Visit: http://www.nursing.umaryland.
edu/academics/pe/events/ [Members eligible for
MHECN member discount!]

RECURRING EVENTS
Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics Seminar
Series, either at Sheik Zayed Tower Chevy Chase
Conference Center (1800 Orleans St.) or Feinstone
Hall, E2030, Bloomberg School of Public Health (615
N. Wolfe St.) Baltimore, MD. 12N-1:15PM. Visit:
http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/educationtraining-2/
seminar-series.
September 11- “Should Preference Surveys Measure
Health?” Speaker: Dan Hausman, PhD, Herbert
A. Simon and Hilldale Professor, Department of
Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison
(Feinstone Hall)
September 25- Speaker: Shannon Sullivan, PhD,
MA, Chair of Philosophy and Professor of Philosophy
and Health Psychology at UNC Charlotte (Feinstone
Hall)
October 9- Speaker: Joanna Radin, PhD, MS,
Assistant Professor, History of Medicine, of
Anthropology and of History, Yale School of
Medicine (Zayed Tower)
October 23- Speaker: Nicole Civita, JD, Assistant
Director, Rian Fried Center for Sustainable
Agriculture & Food Systems, Sterling College
(Feinstone Hall)
November 13- Speaker: Nancy Berlinger, PhD,
MDiv, Research Scholar, The Hastings Center
(Feinstone Hall)
November 27- Speaker: Sean Aas, PhD, Senior
Research Scholar, the Kennedy Institute of Ethics;
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Georgetown
University (Zayed Tower)
December 11- Speaker: Robert Cook Deegan, MD,
Research Professor in the Sanford School of Public
Policy (Feinstone Hall)
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The Law & Health Care Program
Maryland Health Care Ethics
Committee Network
University of Maryland
Francis King Carey School of Law
500 W. Baltimore Street
Baltimore, MD 21201

The Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network (MHECN) is a membership organization, established by the Law and
Health Care Program at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The purpose of MHECN is to facilitate
and enhance ethical reflection in all aspects of decision making in health care settings by supporting and providing informational
and educational resources to ethics committees serving health care institutions in the state of Maryland. The Network attempts to
achieve this goal by:
•

Serving as a resource to ethics committees as they investigate ethical dilemmas within their institution and as they strive to
assist their institution act consistently with its mission statement;

•

Fostering communication and information sharing among Network members;

•

Providing educational programs for ethics committee members, other healthcare providers, and members of the general
public on ethical issues in health care; and

•

Conducting research to improve the functioning of ethics committees and ultimately the care of patients in Maryland.

MHECN appreciates the support of its individual and institutional members. MHECN also welcomes support from affiliate
members who provide additional financial support.
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